



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

1834 Constantinople

439



600042990U

34.

439.



THOUGHTS

ON

THE OCCURRENCES IN THE YEAR 1832,

AT CONSTANTINOPLE,

BETWEEN

RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

IN A LETTER TO

SIR _____ M. P.

LONDON :

J. HATCHARD AND SON, 187, PICCADILLY.

1834.

439 .



LONDON:

IBOTSON AND PALMER, PRINTERS, SAVOY STREET, STRAND.

THOUGHTS,

&c.

SIR,

If it had happened to you to witness the following circumstances :—

Two persons, who were standing on the bank of a deep river, observed a third, to whom they professed themselves to be friends, struggling in the midst of the stream, and endeavouring to support himself, but with efforts so evidently growing weaker and weaker, as to leave no hope of his saving his life, unless speedy assistance were furnished to him. In this condition he implores his friends on the shore, and particularly one of them, who had the reputation of being an excellent swimmer, to come to his relief, intreating the latter especially to send his servants for that purpose ; all of whom had long enjoyed the same reputation, and who, although at the time

they were at some distance from the river, might yet reach it soon enough to save his life. "My dear friend," said the one who was particularly addressed,—“my dear friend, you know well my great regard for you, and the long intimacy which has subsisted between our two families ; but I really cannot spare my servants at this moment ; they are engaged in—in—(hesitating, and in an under tone,)—in coercing another d—d obstinate friend, who will not consent to be drowned ; and—and—in short, I cannot spare *them*, and it will cost me more wages than I can afford to send others.”—His companion, who was looking on without offering any immediate assistance, contented himself with calling in a loud and blustering tone (for such was the character of the man) as if by his voice alone he could arrest the progress of the stream, which was every moment threatening to overwhelm his struggling friend.

In this distress the poor drowning wretch turned his eyes towards the other bank of the river, to which indeed he was much nearer, and there saw a man who had been long his most bitter enemy, who had raised many quarrels with him (most frequently to his great injury) and who very recently had almost succeeded in turning him out of his own house, had it not been for the interference of common friends.

Shame, the consciousness of hatred, and the repugnance to receiving an obligation from his ancient enemy, would have probably withheld him in other circumstances from requesting aid from such a quarter, and in effect had apparently wrought upon him so far as to induce him to apply, in the first instance, to his friend on the opposite bank. But what twig will not a drowning man catch at? how much more then at the stout branch of a great tree overhanging the water, and with a certainty, if he can but reach it, of not breaking it by his own weight?

Overcoming therefore his own scruples, stifling all his feelings, and compressing within his bosom the mingled emotions of rage, jealousy, and fear, with which he was himself agitated, and which, he knew certainly, were rending the heart-strings of his whole family, he calls, in the last agony of despair, to his *quondam* enemy, and implores the immediate assistance of himself and his servants; whom, by-the-by, the latter, either from a presentiment of what was likely to happen, or from an intention to make a voluntary offer of his assistance, had placed in an adjoining field, and had furnished with the necessary machinery usually employed by the HUMANE SOCIETY on such occasions. The means employed were instantly attended with the desired result, and the unfortunate man was saved from

present death by the powerful aid of his greatest enemy.

Now, Sir, to resume the supposition with which I began this letter,—if you had been witness of a transaction like this, what would have been your sentiments?—what, indeed, the sentiments and the language of every man of common sense and common honesty?

Whatever may be your answer; whatever, in short, may be the answer of every sensible and honest man to such a question—**THAT** must inevitably be the answer to a similar question on the conduct of England and France on one side, and of Russia on the other, respectively, in relation to Turkey, or rather to the Grand Seignior, the Sultan Mahmoud. No man, I think, whose actions are regulated by these two principles, but must say—that the conduct of England, on this occasion, was injudicious—that it was unkind and unfriendly—that if the English Government foresaw that their refusal of naval assistance would be followed, as an inevitable result, by an application to Russia, their refusal was an act little short of madness—that if they did *not* foresee this consequence, what must be said of the prudence and foresight of our rulers? For I will not accuse them of the baseness of abandoning the Sultan Mahmoud and, in his person, the throne of the Ottomans to the successful invasion

of a rebel Satrap, whose policy, hardly more enlightened, except by the glare of an insatiable ambition, is incomparably more atrocious and unprincipled than that of his misguided master. Nor, on the other hand, will I impute to them the absurdity of imagining that the Grand Seignior, on learning their refusal to aid him, would sink into the apathy of utter despair, and allow himself to perish rather than exclaim—

Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.

Thank God ! *we* were saved from the disgrace of this latter absurdity—perhaps by the distance of our government from the scene of action—perhaps by the non-arrival of the British ambassador at Constantinople—perhaps (and I think most probably) by the discreet forbearance of our *Chargé d’Affaires* at that capital, who, with the modesty of his natural character, and with the caution resulting from his long experience,* appears to have kept himself in the back-ground, and seeing the arrival of the Russian fleet from the Black Sea at Constantinople, and divining its inevitable consequences, to have observed a prudent reserve on every point except that of promoting—what was then the common object of

* Mr. Mandeville, Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, then *Chargé d’Affaires*, a man with at least thirty years of experience over his head, and still (*proh ! pudor !*) in the subordinate ranks of the diplomacy.

the three powers—the retreat of the Egyptian army, and the re-establishment of peace.

The ambassador of the Citizen King (I give him the title which he assumed to himself in the halcyon days of the July Revolution) of our ally (with whom it seems we are to be united for life and for death)—the French ambassador, the Baron and Admiral Roussin, did not steer clear of this *bévue* ; but being sent to Constantinople, apparently with the commission to dissuade the Grand Seignior from availing himself of the aid of Russia, perhaps to persuade him to countermand the sailing of the Russian fleet, and finding, on his arrival at Constantinople, that a requisition had been actually sent to the Russian ports of the Black Sea, and that a squadron of the fleet was daily expected—(it in effect reached the Bosphorus two days after the arrival of Admiral Roussin)—he went so far, evidently on his own authority, as to demand from the Porte to send back the Russian auxiliary forces, on pain of his instant departure, and to rely upon his engagement, that by the use of the great name of France, he would repel the invasion of Ibrahim, and restore peace and security to the terrified Sultan.

Such a proposition, unsupported by a single ship, or by the immediate prospect of any efficient aid, conveyed, by implication at least, the strange

absurdity, that the Sultan ought rather to perish than save himself by the instrumentality of Russia. What was still worse, such an insult must inevitably have drawn upon the Porte the resentment of the latter; and there would have been left to the Grand Seignior no other defence against the Egyptian army on one side, and the vengeance of Russia on the other, but the great name of France and the verbal assurances of Admiral Roussin.

But the full half (I am even willing to concede that the whole) of this absurdity may be excused to the French negociator, in consideration of the heterogeneous character in which he presented himself at the Sublime Gate. He was an admiral, but ashore; and, with all due deference to our heroes of the navy, an admiral on shore is not superior (to say the best of it) to a landsman in his own craft and profession. He was a diplomatist, but not afloat: for there too the *ultima ratio* of the Citizen King might have furnished him with much more weighty arguments than any to be found in his instructions. What wonder, then, if M. Buteniew on shore, and M. Lasarew afloat, were more than a match for the admiral, who had nothing to oppose to their solid facts but the great name of his country and his own *sesquipedalia verba*!

Alas! the great name, the *magni nominis*

umbra, which was a substance while Napoleon wielded his iron sceptre, and which faded to a shadow at the name of Waterloo, appears to have had no greater effect in alarming Mehemet Ali and his son Ibrahim than it had in comforting and encouraging their fallen master. The former persisted, with a truly Mahometan inflexibility, in demanding the conditions which his ambition had prescribed to itself as its *present* limits: his son continued to move forward, cautiously but steadily, with his victorious Egyptians, notwithstanding the actual presence of a Russian corps on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, and the position of a second more considerable body on the borders of Wallachia: while the unfortunate Sultan, not agitated by any distrust of his new allies, but rather (as I think) alarmed by the apprehension lest the angry passions of his subjects, at the sight of their hated guests, should burst at last into an explosion, kindled by their presence, but which their presence could not restrain, hastened to acquiesce in all the demands of his merciless vassals—the Pachalicks of Syria—the district of Adana—the Cilician Gates—the Passes of Mount Taurus, from which at every moment they may make an irruption into the heart of Asiatic Turkey, and to break through which, if properly defended, the Russian armies themselves will find

a task demanding their utmost valour, discipline, and skill.

It remains for me to analyse the conduct of the other two personages who figure in the allegory which I mentioned to you, Sir, in the outset of this Letter, the drowning Sultan and his late enemy, the Emperor Nicholas. To say that the former was a most unwilling and reluctant suppliant, is to say that man is man; that human nature, with all its storms of hatred, vengeance, fear, is what it has never ceased to be, since it fell from the primitive innocence in which it originally came from the hands of its Creator. I know nothing in the genius of Mahometanism, I recollect nothing in the history of Mahometans, which can lead us to think that they are forgetful or forgiving of injuries received from infidel enemies; or that, shaping their actions by the benevolence of their own sentiments towards humanity in distress, they would solicit from their foes that aid which they would as willingly bestow on them, if they were in the same condition. I fear rather, that even under the influence of a milder and more beneficent system of religion, few christian potentates could be found to subdue the feelings of a false sense of honour, and keep down the turbulent emotions of hatred and vengeance, so far as not to find them aggravated by the necessity of having recourse to an enemy for an indispensable succour.

To what agonies must not the refusal of aid from a government, the only one to which he could at all apply the character of friendly, have exposed the unfortunate Mahmoud !

He knew that there was not a Mussulman in his empire who did not view the Russian with a horror compounded of hatred, revenge, and superstitious dread, founded on a dark tradition that this hated people is destined to drive the Ottoman banner beyond the limits of Europe. If he did not share this feeling (he has now at least more reason than ever to entertain it) he knew that the recent victories of the Russian armies, in the loss of his bravest troops, in the utter destruction of his finances, in the dishonour of the Ottoman name, had encouraged the rebellion of his vassal, while it crippled his own means of repressing it. [The *untoward* affair of Navarino, into which we, the dupes of our naval glory, had been inveigled by the diabolical policy of Russia, had before ruined his maritime power.] Could he forget—

(Manet altâ mente repostâ,

HÆMI PORTARUM, spretæque injuria lunæ)— *

Could he forget the Balkan, the capitulation of Adrianople, the impending fate of the capital, which was only averted by the powerful intervention of the European embassies, and the

* Alas ! no longer a crescent, but fast waning to its fall.

immediate acquiescence of the Porte in the terms of peace dictated by the Emperor Nicholas? Yet with all these bitter recollections, what could be done, when a similar, though more dishonourable, fate impended over him on the other side from the successful inroad of a rebellious vassal, and when one, if not both, of the friends to whom he addressed himself for succour, left him to his fate? Is it possible that they could have entertained the monstrous notion, that the Sultan, rather than have recourse to his former enemy, would rush into the storm, *capite obvoluto*, and sink in the catastrophe which he had no means of averting?

Learning the course of events only from the public journals, foreign or domestic, it is not in my power, Sir, to state with precision the exact mode in which the demand of succour was made, and acceded to by the Russian potentate. It is natural that the demand should have come in the first instance from the Grand Seignior, not that the offer should have originated with the Russian government. The point in question is, whether the Cabinet of St. Petersburg instructed the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople to insinuate to the Sultan the propriety of adopting this step, and the certainty of its being instantly acceded to? or whether (as I think the public journals seem generally to assert). M. Buteniew,

after learning the refusal of England to furnish a squadron of ships, took upon himself to advise the Sultan to address himself for assistance to the Emperor his master, with expressions of his confident hope of the success of the application?

There was ample time, after the knowledge of the refusal of the British Cabinet, for the first of these steps to have been adopted at St. Petersburg—for the Turkish envoy was in England in the month of April of last year, and the denial of succour was probably given towards the end of that month.

The difference is not of great moment. Yet it is but justice to say, that the latter supposition, of the demand originating in the suggestion of the Russian Chargé d’Affaires himself, gives a degree of unpremeditatedness (if I may be allowed to use this *sesquipedal* expression) to the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas and his government, in which it is true they have had ample time since to correct whatever was faulty, and of which no one can justly accuse them a second time.

Let us, however, do justice to the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas: with whatever shame at the contrast of our own behaviour, that of France and England, let us avow, that on the front of it the former bears the impress of kindness, of friendship, of humanity—why should I not say?—of a christian spirit. If it were really selfish—

if it were really ambitious—surely never did an act bear upon the face of it a more disinterested and unambitious character. And let it not be forgotten, that it was in perfect consistency and harmony with the previous conduct of the Emperor, who long before any suspicion was entertained of the extent of Mehemet Ali's designs, or any apprehension of the rapid and successful progress of Ibrahim's arms, had recalled the Russian consul-general from Alexandria, on the express ground, that his Imperial Majesty would afford no countenance, by the presence of his agent, to the hostile machinations of a rebellious vassal against the authority of his master.

How easy would it have been for the court of St. Petersburg, with the cold hard-heartedness of a selfish policy, and under pretence of the jealousy which a contrary conduct might inspire in rival courts; to refuse the requested succour; and waiting patiently until the dagger of Ibrahim, or the bow-string of his slaves, was at the throat of his unfortunate master, then to enter into the Ottoman territories in defence of the rights of sovereigns, and amidst the ruins of a falling empire to seize upon such fragments, as Russian convenience or Russian ambition might require!

The Emperor Nicholas did not act thus: he took the more generous, or what would appear the more

generous, line of policy, and what that very appearance would contribute to render the most judicious line. For, putting aside all further consideration of the motives, be they sordid, be they noble, which dictated this step, I will venture to assert that from the time of Peter the Great to the present day, such a master-stroke of policy will not find its equal in all the annals of Russian diplomacy, fertile as they have been in the conception of great designs, and unscrupulous as their statesmen have constantly been found in their mode of accomplishing them. The price of ten campaigns would have cheaply purchased the vast advantages which it has actually bestowed, and the still greater of which it opens the prospect; and a hundred campaigns would not have acquired them. If M. Buteniew possesses talents at all corresponding to the diplomatic tact and skill which he has discovered on this occasion, and which throw into the shade those of the Strogonows, the Ribeaupierres, and the Orlows of the Russian diplomacy, I shall be much surprised indeed, if on his arrival at St. Petersburg,* he does not receive some high distinction from his gratified master, with great advancement in his career. For no one in the smallest degree acquainted with the tactics

* It appears (23d January 1834) that he has quitted Constantinople on leave of absence.

of the Russian Cabinet is unaware, that while it exacts the most devoted and unscrupulous obedience from those whom it employs, it is even profuse in the rewards which it lavishes upon them. In the present instance too, to reward M. Buteniew is to conciliate still more the good graces of the newly acquired friend the Grand Seignior, by showing him how high a value the Emperor Nicholas sets upon his friendship.

But the limits, within which I am desirous of comprising this letter, and which perhaps your patience in reading it may rather lead you to contract than to enlarge, oblige me to proceed to the consideration of the second part of this most extraordinary drama. I mean the occurrences which took place, and the engagements which were formed between the two courts of Russia and Turkey, after the presence of the Russian fleet and army had attained its object in the pacification of Mehemet Ali, and in the retreat of Ibrahim within the boundaries of his new acquisitions. And I think I cannot do better for the illustration of this point, than to recur once more to the allegory or fable (call it what you please) with which I commenced this letter.

Let us suppose then that the two friends, who were on the one side of the river, finding that their opposite neighbour had resolved to forget all former animosities, and had actually brought

his servants to the edge of the water, immediately declared their willingness to co-operate with him in saving their common friend :—that in effect they did, with no very good grace indeed, contribute their aid, feeble it is true, and which would have been utterly ineffectual, if the stout servants of their neighbour had not rushed into the stream, and stemming the torrent, by their presence, succeeded in rescuing the drowning man :—that in short, by their united, though very unequal, exertions, they had once more placed their friend, in safety indeed, yet with some loss of strength, and not without apprehensions on the part of all of them, that if he were left to himself, he might fall into the same danger again.

Under these circumstances, if the three friends, all feeling, or professing to feel, the greatest anxiety for the future safety of the one they had saved, were really sincere in their professions, the natural course to pursue, as it appears to me, would have been to engage the latter to consent to, and accept, their common engagement to protect him against, and to save him from, any such future calamity ; the two friends on the one side forcing a laugh (if they could laugh) at their own blunder in letting their neighbour obtain all the merit of the late adventure ; the other on his part declaring, that as he had no object in view

but the preservation of his new friend from similar dangers, they might all cordially co-operate toward attaining this common object.

But if instead of inviting the two friends to concur with him in the general design, the other had taken his new friend apart, on the very shore, and almost before he had dismissed his servants, who had so essentially contributed to his deliverance, had said to him: "Now, my dear friend, I have saved your life this once, and will readily endeavour to save it again from whatever danger you may be exposed to: I will even go farther, and come to a written agreement to that effect, and in order to show you how highly I value your friendship, and rate your powerful assistance, you shall agree to do the same thing for me if I am in any danger—(*aside*—which St. Nicholas and his clerks forbid! for he would be a sorry auxiliary.) But, my dear friend, you must do more: you must agree, whatever dangers you may fall into, to receive assistance from no one but me; and that I may be quite sure of this, you must promise me that you will keep your doors shut (as indeed you have hitherto done against us all) and that you will open them to no one whatever without first asking my consent. Between ourselves (but I do not choose to say this out loud) I only wish to keep them shut against these two, your former friends, and you

may open them, and welcome, to any other of our common acquaintance—with my consent, you understand, in order to save appearances ; but you may be assured, my dear friend, that this consent will always and instantly be given.”

Language like this would go far, I think, in raising doubts, that his first act of friendship was not quite so disinterested as he would make it appear ; and that in thus urging his new friend to insult the two oldest acquaintances he had in the world, and to keep himself entirely aloof from them, he might have some sinister design of monopolizing all the favours which the other could bestow, and perhaps, in some moments of weakness or despondency, to turn him out of the house, from which he had before nearly ejected him by open force.

I am quite persuaded, Sir, that this parallel might be pushed much farther, and still more to the disadvantage of Russia, if we were acquainted with all the particulars of the negotiation which was entrusted to Count Orlov, with even the name of the Turkish negociator, if indeed there were any, with the exact terms of the separate article relating to the Dardanelles, and with the precise dates of the treaties, and of the ratifications of them by the two contracting parties. Learning, as I said before, the circum-

stances of this extraordinary transaction only from the public journals, I must reason upon the presumption, that they are in substance correctly stated ; and they must be thought so by the public at large, unless the Russian government think proper to make known the actual documents, which, as far as I am aware, has not yet been done, so as to reach the customary channels of general information.

I learn therefore from these, that some time after the arrival of the Russian fleet and army on the shore of the Bosphorus, Count Orlov reached the Turkish capital from St. Petersburg, and took ostensibly the command of the army, which was in fact little more than presiding over the parade of the troops in the presence of the Grand Seignior, and giving and receiving the honours of the different military fêtes. The principal object of that part of his mission seems to have been to watch the progress and accelerate the march of the Turkish negotiations with Ibrahim and Mehemet Ali ; and to determine the precise moment, when, by the pacification of the contending parties and the retreat of Ibrahim within the new limits of his government, he might securely order the return of the naval and military forces of Russia within her own territory.— I must remark, by-the-by, a circumstance not a little curious, that the pre-

sence of these forces does not appear to have induced Mehemet Ali and his son to relax one single iota of their pretensions, and that they gained every territorial point, at least, for which they professed to have contended. Who will say, that the court of St. Petersburg would not see with pleasure the power of their future intended victim reduced as much as possible, and the necessity of his dependance on their protection augmented by the strength of the potent rebel left on the opposite frontier ?

It was within a very few days before, or a very few days after, the actual departure of the Russian fleet and army, that Count Orlow opened to the Grand Seignior (in person, it is said, with what truth I cannot pretend to judge) the main object of his visit to Constantinople. Various great motives would lead him to this line of conduct, and would prevent him from opening his mission too soon.—The first, not to have the indelicacy of urging upon the Grand Seignior the demand of a great favour, while the Russian army was yet present, or had not yet completed its task : for no man knows better than the Russian how to simulate a virtue, if he have it not.—A second, perhaps, and not an unreasonable one, that if any suspicion of such a negociation should reach the French or English ambassador (for I think Lord Ponsonby had by this time reached

the capital) one or both might throw obstacles in the way of the pacification.—A third, and that perhaps the most powerful, that he should take the Sultan in the first transports of his gratitude, and that he should make him feel that his own immediate departure would hardly allow much time for deliberation, far less admit of any alteration in the language or stipulations of the treaty which he proposed.

For I cannot entertain a doubt that Count Orlov came from St. Petersburg with the treaty drawn up in all its forms, and with instructions to admit of no alteration: and I should like to see the Russian negociator, let his rank and his favour be what it might, who would dare, even *sub spe rati*, to sign any instrument which should infringe such an instruction. Indeed, if it be true, as the same public papers agree in asserting, that this ambassador exchanged the ratifications of the treaty with the ministers of the Porte before his departure from Constantinople, this point is put incontestably beyond dispute: for the literal copy of the whole treaty must have been recited in the body of the instrument of ratification, before the Emperor Nicholas affixed his signature; and there was then no possibility of admitting even the most minute alteration. The wily ministers of the northern potentate were no doubt too sensible of the im-

policy of permitting space to intervene, between the signature and ratification, for after-reflections or for repentance.

According to the accounts given in the public prints of the stipulations of this treaty, it should seem that they reciprocally promise to each power assistance with all their forces, in case of attack or danger from any third enemy whatever, internal or external. I do not recollect that it has been any where asserted, on authority, that this reciprocal assistance should be exclusive; that is, that the Porte should receive assistance from Russia *alone*, and *vice versâ*. The separate article, relating to the Dardanelles, adds this link to the chain; and it is by a natural and unavoidable deduction from this article, that the Ottoman engages himself to recur to no aid but that of the Russian autocrator: for to whom could he have recourse, without violating the engagement, which renders the opening of that gate to any power whatever (not to say an ally) dependent upon the consent of the latter?

And now, Sir, if the fact be as I have stated, or rather presumed it to be, you cannot but admire the extreme art with which Russia has, step by step, estranged the Ottoman Porte from its former friends, and has led it into an *act*, if not a *state*, of hostility. A treaty of defensive alliance, if it be really no more, between two

powers, has nothing in itself which can furnish
 just cause of hostility to a third, however it may
 displease or mortify the latter ; and would, there-
 fore, if offered to the acceptance of the Sultan,
 present nothing to alarm his fears of involving
 himself in a quarrel with France or England.
 Perhaps it would be hardly too much to assert,
 that an *exclusive* defensive alliance (in the sense
 in which I have just used the expression)—the
 two powers exclusively of the whole world, and
 against the whole world (defensively)—that
 even this alliance furnishes no sufficient ground
 of quarrel to the rest. But a stipulation so
 broad, an engagement so palpably designed to
 exclude the Sultan from all foreign aid (that of
 Russia excepted) while it might excite his
 apprehensions, would certainly alarm his pride ;
 and he was therefore to be approached, in the
 second place, after the first step was gained, by
 a demand involving in appearance only what the
 Porte had constantly claimed, and hitherto ex-
 exercised (with rare exceptions) as an undoubted
 right—that of allowing the passage of the Dar-
 danelles to no power whatever—WITHOUT THE
 CONSENT OF RUSSIA. The sense of these few
 words, let it have been couched in what terms
 it may, gives another character to the whole trans-
 action, and converts a system of defensive
 alliance into one of aggressive hostility against

any power which may be of importance enough to think the measure directed against itself; while it annihilates the independence of the Turkish empire, and renders it a vassal of the Russian autocrator.

For what in fact is one, perhaps the most characteristic, perhaps the most degrading, feature of a state of vassalage? Must we recur to the ages of the feudal system, now politically extinct among all the civilized nations of Europe? Or shall we seek for its parallel among the serfs of Russia or rayahs of the Ottoman? By the ancient system, it was—not the obligation of the vassal to furnish aid to his liege lord when attacked; for that was repaid and humanized, if I may say so, by the reciprocal engagement of the Suzerain to defend his feudatory against all attacks. No: it was, that in no danger, however imminent—in no assault, however fatal, should the vassal implore aid from any other than his lord paramount; that if he could, he should not be saved by any other hand but his; and that if he were such a rebel to his feudal allegiance as not to consent to perish rather than receive foreign aid, the unhappy vassal must expect to be pursued with a more exemplary vengeance than even his intrusive preserver.

What, let me ask, would the Turks have done? What in short did they endeavour to

do in these our days, when their rayahs, the Greeks of the Peloponnesus, looked to every power under heaven for aid? Was not the war against them declared to be, and was it not in reality, as far as it was carried, a war of extirpation? from which the Russians, as well as other powers, preserved them? These flexible moralists, who would condemn to the knout or to Siberia the miserable serf, if suffering under the evils of humanity, or even under the visitations of heaven, he were to apply for succour to any other than his own master—they can close their eyes against their own system to serve a great object of ambition. But be assured, Sir, that they know all the extent and all the force of an engagement which binds the power with whom they treat, to refuse all aid but what is furnished by themselves; and the Commander of the Faithful, who fetters himself by a solemn compact to be aided by no other power without the consent, is in fact, though with more courtly terms, and in more specious language, no better than the serf, of his Russian deliverer.

If, on the one hand, the combination of the treaty of alliance with the prohibition of the separate article takes away the independence of the Ottoman Porte, it falls, on the other, into the gross absurdity, of which the conduct of the Admiral Roussin incurs, in some degree, the im-

putation—namely, that of expecting that the Grand Seignior must be content to perish rather than demand extraneous assistance, even if any circumstances whatever were to put it out of the power of Russia to give it in time, or to give it at all; with this insulting addition, that the Sultan is to give his engagements to abide by this absurdity. Unless Russia is to keep her fleet in the Black Sea always afloat, always manned and equipped; unless she is to maintain a large body of troops in a constant state of service at Odessa and the other ports on the north of that sea, it would not be difficult to imagine a case, I should think (an insurrection in Asia Minor, for instance, fomented and suddenly headed by Ibrahim, issuing from the passes of the Taurus) in which neither the fleet nor army of Russia could furnish assistance in time. The Grand Seignior then, in such a case, is bound to refuse the passage of a French or English squadron, or both combined, unless the consent of the Emperor Nicholas shall have been first obtained—an event, I presume, which might be safely referred to the Greek calends.

But it will be said perhaps—indeed it has been said by the two governments in question, or by their partizans in the foreign journals in their name—that independent nations have a complete right to make such treaties of alliance

as they may think proper, without justly incurring the hatred or resentment of a third power. And on the part of the Ottoman Porte, it has been declared by the Reis Effendi (so it is said) that the separate stipulation with Russia, in relation to the passage of the Dardanelles by ships of war, is no more than a repetition of what has been frequently declared in treaties and otherwise, as the invariable usage of the Turkish government.—This answer is false, if we are to understand by it, that the consent of a third power was ever before necessary to the temporary suspension of the prohibition: for it may be safely asserted, that in no treaty whatever, and in no verbal agreement whatever on the part of the Porte, was it possible that a stipulation so degrading to both the contracting parties could have been admitted. In the eleventh article of the treaty of Constantinople, signed in 1809 between Mr. (now Sir Robert) Adair and the Ottoman plenipotentiaries, this prohibition is expressly inserted as the rule of conduct established by their government. But would a man of honour, like Sir Robert Adair, have hesitated an instant to spurn the article from his treaty, had he been told that this prohibition might be occasionally relaxed, if he could obtain the consent of the court of St. Petersburg, or

of the court of Napoleon, who was then all-powerful at Constantinople?

Allowing the abstract right to *independent* nations to form defensive alliances (though these may furnish just grounds of jealousy or offence) let them at least *be* independent; and let us not be told, that if France, or Austria, or England, or Naples, or the United States of America, desire to send an ambassador in one of their ships of war to Constantinople, she must cast anchor at Tenedos, and await there—not the permission of the Sublime Porte, but the consent of the court of St. Petersburg—the ukase of the Emperor Nicholas, not the firman of the Grand Seignior, unless countersigned by the Russian autocrator, or fortified, perhaps, by the *visa* of his Chargé d’Affaires at Constantinople, whom he condescends to delegate for these minor cases.

Sir, in the commerce and intercourse of nations with each other, the first principle on which these are founded and must be carried on, is the supposition that they are both masters at home; that on any point of demand or complaint, of consent or refusal, the decision is in the power of the government addressed; and that in all questions of internal regulation, as a thing of course, no reference to a third party can be

imagined possible. It is not, therefore, England and France alone (to whom, however, this Turkish regulation is particularly and solely meant to apply) who have a right to be displeased with it, and to express their displeasure in what way they may think proper;—every independent nation may see in it the first principle of social intercourse violated, and may justly draw the conclusion, that no favour (not to say, no justice) is to be expected in matters which may be prejudicial or displeasing to the favoured power; and that a nation which has sacrificed its own independence to gratify the ambition and to forward (perhaps unconsciously) the sinister and dangerous views of its new friend, will feel little scruple to violate the rights of any other which may appear to thwart or counteract them.

But we must advance a step farther in the considerations to which this question leads. It cannot be presumed, that when the Ottoman Porte has discovered so much complaisance for the Russian monarch, as to place the keys of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in his hands, it can have refused to the latter the power of unlocking them for his own purposes; that is, that it has not granted to Russia the free ingress and egress to or from the Euxine Sea. And what is this but an act of such decided enmity

on the part of Turkey, as to justify the demand of its immediate revocation in a time of peace, or an instant declaration of war against her on the part of any power who might at the time be engaged in actual hostilities with Russia? Let us suppose a parallel case on land, which may approach nearer to our experience, and which may therefore fall more easily within our comprehension. If, for example, the King of Prussia had engaged himself towards his son-in-law, the Emperor Nicholas, to afford a free passage through his dominions to the Russian armies, in order to meet the French or any other enemy—(and God knows whether such an engagement do not really exist; this I know, Sir, that Prussia would find it very difficult to resist the demand)—put the supposition however;—who can doubt that France, from the moment of such an engagement, must hold herself in preparation, even in time of profound peace, against a sudden and unexpected invasion?—that she would have a right to demand the retraction of the engagement?—and that, in fact, politically speaking, it would be more for her interests, as it would be perfectly consistent with her rights, to prefer an instant and open hostility to that precarious and insecure state which contains within itself all the hardships of war with none of its exciting energies and hopes? Such, however, though in

a still more aggravated shape, is the effect of the closure of the Dardanelles for every foreign power, Russia excepted, who can thus, in perfect security and silence, hold her fleet of twenty-two sail of the line, and army of more than as many thousands, ready at any moment of favourable wind, to appear on any point of the coast of the Mediterranean, Spain, Italy, Egypt; and not to be prevented, except at an expense to the maritime powers, little inferior to the burthens of war, and incomparably more teasing and disheartening.

But this state, a subject as it is of jealousy and anxiety to the powers of France and England, united here most justly in a common cause, is one of real and imminent danger to the power whose security is the most interesting to them—the Ottoman Porte, the new friend and ally of Russia: and precisely because Russia is its friend and ally, will that danger appear greater to all who have paid attention to the course of policy and conduct of the latter, since she has ranked among civilized nations.

There are two rules of conduct (I cannot call them principles) which the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and the successive princes who have presided in it, almost from the time of Peter the Great to the present day, have laid down as maxims of state, from one of which, at least,

it is their boast never to have swerved. This latter rule is an undeviating resolution, followed as a maxim of state policy by the directing senate, never to sign a treaty of peace, and consequently never to undertake a war, without an acquisition of additional territory. The other rule, of which indeed it would not be quite so decent to make a boast, is an unscrupulous (if I were to use the epithet of the traveller Lydiard, an unprincipled) adoption of every mean by which the end and object of the first maxim may be attained and secured.

Why should I speak of the wars excited by means of insurrections, unprovoked aggressions, arbitrary invasions, and iniquitous combinations (among the first examples that of Peter the Great against the young sovereign of Sweden, Charles the Twelfth) and the enormous acquisitions made by Russia in Livonia, Poland, the Crimea, and the whole length of the northern coast of the Black Sea? Let us come nearer to our own times, and to transactions, *quæ vidimus ipsi*.

At the peace of Tilsit in 1807 the Russian empire gained, on its Polish frontier, a small accession of territory, not at the expense of Napoleon, who dictated the terms of peace, and who was as little disposed to understand, as to acquiesce in, this Russian maxim of state policy,

but at the expense of Russia's faithful and unfortunate ally, the king of Prussia, who was then standing on the very last strip of his own dominions—and on its north-western frontier the whole duchy of Swedish Finland, taken from another ally, to whom the dismemberment of this province was one of the great causes which led to the loss of his throne and crown. The truth is, that the famous maxim of Russian policy, never to lose by a treaty of peace, was in great danger of becoming a dead letter under the iron hand of Bonaparte, and the only way to save it from the fate of other lying oracles, was to support its credit and its veracity at the expense of friends, when enemies were so perverse as not to give it confirmation at their own charge.

In the year 1809, the same hard-hearted conqueror (I mean Bonaparte) relented so far as to give another proof of the truth of the Russian maxim, by stipulating, though with much reluctance, in his treaty of peace with the emperor of Austria, that Russia should receive from Polish or Austrian Galicia a territorial acquisition of four hundred thousand souls—the fashionable mode, *à la Russe*, of estimating the value of landed property by the live stock upon it.

We have lately seen, Sir, in the debates of the French Chamber of Deputies, a very remarkable speech of M. Bignon, as reported in

the public journals, in which he refers to the famous Conference at Erfurt, in the year 1808, between the Emperor Alexander and Napoleon, and relates the earnest instances made by the former to induce the French Emperor to consent to his invasion of the Turkish dominions, the possession of Constantinople, and the occupation of the Dardanelles which he (the Russian autocrat) was pleased to call **THE GATES OF HIS OWN HOUSE**—expressing his willingness to sacrifice to Bonaparte, that is, to leave at his free disposal Spain, Italy, or any other conquest on that side, which might suit his convenience or gratify his ambition, as well as such parts of the Ottoman dominions in Europe, as would not interfere, be it understood, with Alexander's own views on the eastern part of European Turkey.

I wish M. Bignon had been a little less chary of the reputation of his *quondam* master; and instead of praising the disinterestedness of the Emperor Napoleon, of which we are able to form at least as just an estimate as M. Bignon, in refusing this proposition of his good brother, he had given us a few more extracts from his own Journal of the conferences at Erfurt: for if I am not much mistaken in my recollections, he was himself present on that occasion. We should then have learnt, with what bait the wily Corsican, knowing the weak side of the Russian

policy, contrived to hook the Emperor Alexander into the war against Austria, which took place in the following year. The price paid, as we have seen, was small, and probably much below what was promised; but it was sweetened by the merit of adding another instance to the maxim of Russian policy, never to lose by a treaty of peace, even though the acquisition be made at the expense of a friend.

We should then learn on what conditions the Emperor Napoleon consented at the same conferences of Erfurt, that the two provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia should be taken from the Ottoman empire to be incorporated with that of Russia: although with a perfidious art and a want of principle, in which he was armed at all points, a match for friends or enemies, he contrived to hold Russia in the hot water of a Turkish war until his own plans were ripe for execution against that empire, which was content to rid itself of one enemy almost at the expense of its own policy, when threatened with a new and much more formidable adversary. It did however acquire, by the treaty of Bucharest of 1812, a considerable portion of Moldavia and the whole of Bessarabia.

Perhaps, Sir, it will be some surprise to you—perhaps it will be a piece of new intelligence even to M. Bignon, that just before the conclu-

sion of this peace, a plan was conceived by the Russian cabinet, and proposed to a third power for its co-operation, by which all the Slavonic nations were to be excited to a general insurrection against their sovereigns—a plan which would have set in a flame the whole of the countries from the eastern shores of the Adriatic to those of the Black Sea, and which, while it would have been a powerful engine of hostility against the Turks, would have involved in the same conflagration all the provinces of the Austrian monarchy, along the whole course of the Danube, or to the south of it, which could come under the denomination of Slavonic.

It would be putting your patience to too severe a trial, if I were to add to this detail all the arts which were resorted to since the peace of 1815 in relation to the affairs of Greece and Turkey; by what means, through the instrumentality of the Russian ambassadors at the Porte, the former was excited to insurrection and revolt; by what scenes of cruelty and oppression, the consequences of this revolt, the sympathies of the English and French nations, and of the Russian too (God bless the mark!) were roused into hostile opposition against the proceedings of the Turks; and, when by the affair at Navarino the three powers were so committed against the Porte, that none could interpose with an offer of

mediation, how the Emperor Nicholas enters upon the scene with his own particular quarrel against the Ottoman empire, and conducts it, as we have all so recently seen, to the passage of Mount Hæmus, the capitulation of Adrianople, and the degrading peace consequent upon that event—the most deadly blow which the Ottoman power ever received, if we except the results of the late act of Russian friendship.

These are master-strokes of policy, it must be allowed, and it *will* be allowed by all those who think, that in politics morality has neither place nor name ; that *rem, si possis, recté ; sed quoque modo rem* is to be the governing principle of nations ; that in their concerns with each other friend and enemy are convertible terms ; and that there may be a thousand justifiable occasions, in which, if you cannot attain your object by beating your enemy, you may do so more easily and more safely by overreaching your friend.

But let such politicians act at least consistently with their belief and their concessions. If they will regard history as an old almanac, let them not refuse to consult it as such. Let them do, as I understand the old almanac makers were accustomed to do in foretelling the state of the weather for the year. They traced back, it is said, a series of years corresponding with the

cycle of the moon of nineteen years ; and ascertaining by such registers of the weather as **they** could discover, its actual state for any past **year**, they holdly set down the same weather as **likely** to occur in the corresponding year of the succeeding cycle.

If therefore they would look back through cycles of unscrupulous and unprincipled ambition, let them not all of a sudden imagine that for the future the whole conduct of such a cabinet is to be directed by the rule of a scrupulous integrity, and of a strict moral principle ; that all former enmities are to be forgotten for ever ; and that new friendships are to be cultivated with undeviating good faith, and with a benevolence never to end, and never to wax cold. Better not consult the old almanac at all, than decide that the weather *must* be the contrary of what it has been before ; better appeal not at all to the experience of history, than to cite it only for the purpose of proof, that what has happened once *cannot* by possibility ever occur again. With such examples of former years before our eyes, if it were only for the sake of common prudence, let us suppose it possible (not to say probable) that they may occur again ; and the moment we admit such a supposition, it becomes our duty (I speak of Great Britain and France), because it is in our power, to counteract

and defeat all such designs, if attempted, and (what is better than all) to prevent the attempt. Without meaning to impeach the present intentions of the Russian government, I say, Sir, that the *exclusive* position in which the Emperor Nicholas has placed himself towards the Ottoman Porte, creates a state of uneasiness and jealousy, which two such powers as France and England cannot, and ought not to, submit to suffer; and that therefore it *must*, I say peremptorily and emphatically *must*, be put an end to.

But how, you will say, can this object be now attained? Now that the exclusive alliance has been formed; now that the Ottoman Porte has ceded the gates of the Dardanelles, or at least that the Emperor Nicholas has put the key in his pocket? Will the honour of such a nation as Russia, the pride of such a sovereign as its autocrat, yield such acquired advantages without a struggle, without force? And what a force must that be?

Be not alarmed, Sir; I am not *yet* going to draw out the plan of a campaign: because I am persuaded that at this moment the whole question may be satisfactorily settled, and settled for years (with the blessing of Heaven) not only without shedding a drop of blood, not only without a single cannon shot, but without of-

fending the honour or wounding the dignity either of the Grand Seignior or his great ally. If the intentions of the Russian government towards the Porte be really and sincerely what the Emperor Nicholas has pledged his word that they are—if no idea be entertained, and if the defensive alliance contain no stipulation, but that of preserving the entirety of the Ottoman empire in its actual state, and protecting its independence, against all foreign and all internal invasion and violation—how can he be offended? How ought he not rather to be pleased, if England and France offer to unite with Russia in the same common object? What can prevent these two powers from becoming contracting parties jointly with her to a new league of defensive alliance for the safety of the Porte, and from adding their guarantee, no contemptible one, to that of the Emperor? Let the exclusive treaty be annulled, or rendered no longer exclusive, if it be really so innocent, by admitting other powers as co-parties to it. Let the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus be closed indiscriminately to all the powers, as it has hitherto been, under the sole controul of the Porte, which has the sole right, and which can never see with indifference the shock of hostile fleets within its own waters. What should hinder the immediate proposition of a tri-partite treaty, with and

toward the Ottoman Porte? or a quadri-partite? For I would on no account exclude the House of Austria, which has shewn by an uniform conduct of now almost half a century, the deep interest which it takes in the conservation and independence of the Porte, and which has acquired by that conduct a respect and a consideration with the Turkish government, which no other power in Europe enjoys. Why not, in short, a multi-partite treaty, to which may be admitted any other power in Europe (Prussia and Spain for instance) which may think itself entitled either by its weight or by its local interests to claim such a pre-eminence?

But you will say, the exclusive treaty of alliance of so great a power as Russia furnishes a guarantee as effectual as any number of contracting parties could do, if—aye, if—but who will be the security of the security? Who will be the *garant* (I want an English term) of the guarantee? We Englishmen, who know somewhat more of India than other people, by experience, or by hearsay, or by reading, have learnt that sometimes the inhabitants of that country have caught and brought into their houses a young tyger cub, and by kind treatment and plentiful feeding have domesticated him so that he has behaved as prettily, and conducted himself as civilly, as a domestic cat or a faithful watch-dog. But that

all of a sudden, on any slight provocation, or no provocation at all, he forgets that he has been tamed; and then friend or foe, *Tros Tyriusve nullo discrimine habetur*. Such and so precarious must ever be the guarantee of an *exclusive* treaty of protection, more especially between a stronger and a weaker power, between a reconciled enemy and a fallen foe.

But in this treaty, of which I have offered you the outline, between the three or more powers on the one hand, and the Ottoman empire on the other, the security for its fulfilment and duration is as strong and efficient as it can possibly be in such fluctuating circumstances, and in such perpetual changes as human institutions must be subject to. If, for example, Russia, yielding at last to the long-suppressed suggestions of ancient hatred, or to the seductions of an insatiable cupidity, should attempt to violate her engagements, France and England and Austria would be ready to reconcile the jarring elements, or to curb the sallies of an inordinate ambition. If, again, France, with less inducements because with less favourable circumstances of proximity and contact, the other three powers would present to her the same insurmountable obstacles. I will not allow such a supposition in the case of Austria, when I consider the policy which has now so long guided her councils in the question of

Turkey. And as for Great Britain, the nature of her preponderant maritime force, which removes her almost entirely from the dry land, and the limited amount of her military means, hardly equal to those of any one of the great continental powers, forbid even the suspicion that she could ever entertain views of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey; and that she could bid defiance for that purpose to all the other contracting parties, to hardly one of which, on land, could she oppose herself on equal terms. If, in fine, the three great powers to the north and east of Europe, were to unite in an iniquitous combination to divide among themselves the spoils of the Ottoman empire according to their localities or convenience, is it probable, let me ask, that France and England, whose united force is fully a match for the others, would quietly continue with folded arms, and with a base attention to their selfish interests or their immediate security, silently witness the repetition of a tragedy which sixty years ago erased a great kingdom from the list of European sovereignties, and which unsettled from that time, and to this very hour keeps unsettled, all the relations of the commonwealth of Europe?

If England and France had ever entertained, during the pendency of the Turkish negotiations of last year with Mehemet Ali and his son, any

idea of a treaty like that which I have described, it is quite clear that the precipitation with which the Russian government pressed upon the Grand Seignior, in the first joy of his deliverance, their own exclusive treaty of alliance, would have prevented its proposal at that time. Shall I say that this precipitation itself stamps the transaction with a character of suspicion, if not towards the Ottoman Porte, at least towards the two powers in question, and is but an indifferent augury of the success of the proposition, were it to be made now? But yet I think, Sir, it ought to be made by the two governments of France and England, in a perfect concert and unity of views on this great question:—without threat—not without demonstration and precautionary preparations (which ought to be seen and known, but not mentioned)—with a grave and calm determination, conveyed in unimpassioned and even in friendly terms, to encounter, however reluctantly, the utmost extremities, if Russia will not accede to a treaty, the object of which is precisely the same as that which she professes to have in view.

The peace of the three or four powers, which is the peace of at least two quarters of the globe, is of too much moment to be given up without one great attempt to preserve it:—and it ought to be well felt by all parties, and even declared

by those who choose to announce it, that it can only be preserved on this condition.

I own to you, Sir, and not without great pain, that I am far from being sanguine in my expectation of any happy result from this proposition, which I press so earnestly upon the two governments, were they to consent, as most certainly they ought to do, to make it. The tone of undignified mockery, which the cabinet of Russia has thought proper to adopt in answer to a note,* on the sub-

* The undersigned Chargé d'Affaires of His Majesty the King of the French has received orders to express to the cabinet of St. Petersburg the profound affliction (*la profonde affliction*) which the French government has felt at the intelligence of the conclusion of the convention of the 7th of July of the present year between His Majesty the Emperor of Russia and the Grand Seignior. According to the view of the government of the king, this convention gives a new character to the mutual relations of the Ottoman empire and Russia, against which the European powers are justified in pronouncing themselves. The undersigned is therefore authorized to declare, that the French government, in case the stipulations of this convention should hereafter lead to an armed intervention of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, shall think itself perfectly at liberty to adopt such a conduct as the circumstances may allow, and in that case to behave as if the above-mentioned convention were not in existence. The undersigned is also directed to acquaint the Imperial cabinet, that a corresponding declaration has been made to the Ottoman Porte by His Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople.

St. Petersburg, October , 1833.

(Signed)

I. DE LEGRENE.

ject of the exclusive treaty, of the French Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg (delivered, it is

The undersigned has received the note in which M. de Legréné, Chargé d'Affaires of His Majesty the King of the French, has communicated to him the profound regret (*le profond regret*) which the conclusion of the convention of the 8th of July between Russia and the Porte has occasioned to the French government, without however explaining the motives of this regret, or the nature of the objections to which the convention may have given occasion. In fact, the convention of the 8th of July is perfectly defensive, concluded between two independent powers, who use their rights in their full extent, and invade the interests of no power whatever. Of what nature then can the objections be which other powers may think themselves justified in making against an agreement of this kind? How can they declare that they allow no validity to it, if it does not enter into their views to overthrow an empire which the convention is intended to uphold? Yet such cannot be the intention of the French government:—this would be in open contradiction to all the declarations which have issued from it during the late embarrassments of the East. The undersigned must therefore infer, that the view taken in the note of M. de Legréné rests upon incorrect data, and that his government, by the communication of the convention on the part of the Porte to the French ambassador at Constantinople, will have gained a better insight into it, and will consequently appreciate more justly the value and the advantage of an agreement, which has been concluded in a spirit not less pacific than conservative. To be sure, that act alters the nature of the relations between Russia and the Porte, for it substitutes in the place of ancient enmity relations of intimacy and confidence, in which the Turkish government will find henceforward a pledge of its durability, and, in case of necessity, suitable measures of defence to insure its maintenance. In this persuasion, and guided by

said, on what authority I know not, *in concert with the government of England*) is a circum-

the purest and most disinterested sentiments, His Majesty the Emperor is resolved faithfully to fulfil, when the case may occur, the obligation laid upon him in the convention of the 8th of July, and so to act as if the declaration contained in the note of M. de Legréné were not in existence.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

St. Petersburg, October 1833

Berlin, December 23.

For more than ten years past, the admirers, every day becoming fewer and fewer, of the old classical French style, complain of the daily increasing innovations, by which, in effect, barbarism has advanced with rapid strides. It appears at this time to invade the official writings of the French cabinet. Thus it expressed itself a short time ago in the note which, *in concert with the English government*, it presented to the court of Russia upon the convention concluded by the latter with the Ottoman Porte, that it saw with deep affliction (*une profonde affliction*) this convention, because it might give occasion to misunderstandings; and at the same time declared, that if it should appear to run counter to its interests, it (the French cabinet) would be disposed to regard it as not in existence. The Vice-Chancellor, Nesselrode, answered thereupon, that the Russian cabinet likewise saw with profound regret (*avec un profond regret*) this protestation, and would consider it, in case it should run counter to its interests, as not in existence. On this occasion, Count Pozzo di Borgo observed to M. Guizot, *the Minister of Public Instruction*, that the word *affliction* was here made use of improperly; which apparently turned upon the circumstance, that the French note was first drawn up in English by Lord Palmerston.

stance even more discouraging than the expression of a determined resolution of the Emperor

Having never seen the above-cited French note and its answer in any English or French journal, though it may have been inserted in some that I have not seen, I have given a translation of it from the German, and also of a German article of a previous date, purporting to be a letter from Berlin, and containing a criticism upon the *French* expressions of the *French* government, used by their own *French* agent at St. Petersburg.—A criticism upon the *French* language by the *Russian* Nesselrode and by the *Corsican* Count Pozzo di Borgo, to whom the Berlin article ascribes it, is modest—to say the least of it. But I will not believe it of the latter, Count Pozzo, who has too much good sense not to feel, that his half-Italianized, Corsican tongue and ear disqualify him from pronouncing judgment upon such a subject, however long he may have been habituated to the use of the French language. And why address his criticism to M. Guizot, and not to the Duke de Broglie? But the opportunity of giving a slap of the face to the *Minister of Public Instruction* was too tempting to be passed over.—I am not quite so willing to acquit M. de Nesselrode, whose impertinent affectation in changing the word “affliction” into the word “regret” has furnished the occasion of the Berlin criticism. After all, perhaps it is to be attributed to some hyper-critics of the latter capital, who claiming to themselves the superiority in science over the rest of Germany, are desirous of breaking a lance against the dictionary of the French Academy. Will they not remember the critique of a greater Corsican than Count Pozzo on reading the Prussian manifesto of the 9th October, 1806, from the head quarters of Erfurt, written probably by Count Haugwitz or M. Lombard, in the name of their master—*Quoi! Mon Frere n'entend pas le François!*—But let us hear the dictionary of the French Academy.

Nicholas to maintain at all hazards the engagement which he has contracted with the Porte. But the proposal ought still to be made as well to the Turkish as to the Russian government: and the very circumstance of an offer to co-operate with the latter in the conservation of the

AFFLICTION.—Déplaisir et abattement d'esprit—Sorrow and depression of spirit.

REGRET.—Déplaisir d'avoir perdu un Bien qu'on possédoit, on d'avoir manqué celui que l'on auroit pu acquérir.—Sorrow at having lost a good which was once possessed, or at having missed one, which might have been acquired.

REGRET.—Il se dit *quelquefois* de toute sorte de déplaisir, ou léger on considérable—It is *sometimes* said of any sort of sorrow, either slight or great.

It is evident then, that *une profonde affliction* (a profound grief or sorrow) is the legitimate expression; that the first definition of the word *regret*, as its very construction shows, implies the looking back to a lost or not acquired good, which could not be used in the case of the Russian diplomatist; and that by the sense in which it is *sometimes* used of grief or sorrow in general, M. de Nesselrode, or the arch-critics of Berlin, barely escape being unhorsed in their tilting career with the French Academy, the expounders of the old classical style.

I must add to this long note the observation, that the French government in October last appears not to have been in possession of an exact copy of the Convention of the 8th of July 1833 (nor even of the date); and that Russia had given its orders to the Porte to communicate it to the French ambassador at Constantinople.

The Duke de Broglie declared however on the 9th of January, of this year, in the Chamber of Deputies, that he was not then in possession of the copy.

Turkish empire must produce a favourable impression on the members of the Divan, who, whatever may be the present sentiments of the Sultan, cannot but see with sorrow and apprehension its integrity and security dependent upon the fidelity of a single power, recently its most bitter enemy. It will have this farther good effect too, of removing the suspicion which perhaps in some degree attaches to the British government, and certainly still more to that of France, of having incited and encouraged the rebellion of Mehemet Ali, which has led to these consequences.

Even the rejection of this proposition on the part of the court of St. Petersburg will not be without its advantage. It will justify more and more the presumption, that Russia has acquired for herself advantages not avowed in the treaty, perhaps secretly stipulated; or that she entertains ulterior views of aggrandizement at the expence of Turkey, which she dare not and would not avow, and the acquisition of which she may leave to future occurrences to bring about, or to her own arts to accelerate and mature to its accomplishment. For who will imagine that a nation so powerful on the one hand, so interested on the other (as more than a century of still craving ambition has shown her) will have proposed to herself no other reward for her late

assistance to the Ottoman, than the reciprocal obligation contracted by the Porte to assist Russia with its naval and military means, in case of an attack upon her? Or what power or powers, in the name of common sense, if engaged in hostile contest with Russia, would regard the whole force of the Turkish empire as more than a feather if thrown into her scale? Even the closure of the Dardanelles against the flag of every nation, if meant to apply to Russia as to all others, would be a real disservice to her in case of war, by condemning her fleets to a state of inactivity in the ports of the Black Sea; and this consideration is itself a proof, if any were wanting, that the stipulation relative to the Dardanelles is not meant as applicable to Russia, who will have the complete right of egress and ingress, while it is denied to all others. This exclusive advantage, so hostile in its intention to every other nation, may become in the hands of an ambitious and perfidious court a rich recompence for its recent assistance.

If however, contrary to all expectation, the court of St. Petersburg were to consent to the proposals made by those of Paris and London, for a treaty of common guarantee of the integrity and security of the Ottoman dominions, to which Austria and other powers might be invited to accede, I think that no measure, certainly no

diplomatic measure, could be found so happily adapted as this to secure the peace of Europe for a long period, at least as relates to the south-eastern portion of this continent, and to the provinces of Asiatic Turkey; that is, to those countries, an invasion on which would do more towards overthrowing the whole federative system and the present equilibrium of Europe, than any other occurrence which could possibly take place.

It may be said with truth, that for the last half century perhaps, assuredly for the last twenty or twenty-five years, the Ottoman empire has been preserved in its integrity, and even in its existence, less by its own power than by the impossibility of those nations, which covet its possessions, coming to any agreement on the mode of partitioning them, and by the jealousy of other powerful states, who having no wish to share in the spoil, or being inconveniently situated for annexing to themselves any of the dismembered portions, have constantly resisted any encroachment on its essential and vital security. If we consider the subject truly, we must confess that this monarchy, powerful as it might be, and as it has been to a degree to endanger the whole federative system of Europe, has yet never been a real member of that system, or a preponderating power, contributing to the equilibrium of the

European states. From an instinct of self-preservation, from a sentiment (of late years) of its own increasing feebleness, it has thrown itself occasionally into the weaker scale, now siding with England and Russia against Napoleon, now with France against the other two, according as the one or the other seemed to threaten danger to its own peculiar interests.

But this state, which merely by its existence, incidentally as it were and almost, if I may say so, without meaning it—contributes to preserve the balance among the powers of Europe, would utterly and for ever destroy that balance, if falling into the hands of the one great potentate, whose vicinity and whose power have so long threatened it, it were added to the momentum of that vast machine, which marches on with the steadiness, though not with the velocity, of our loco-motive engines, and of which the advancing mass even now can hardly be contemplated without apprehension and horror. The exclusive protection of a weak ally is a great step towards his subjugation, in some respects perhaps preferable to it; and it is from a deep sense of the vast advantages to be derived from it by Russia, that I fear the idea of a treaty of general guarantee, such as I have described it, will be instantly rejected by the Russian ministry.

What then is to be done, you will ask? To what does this long disquisition tend? Is it to show us our present or impending danger, without pointing out the means of averting it? What is the remedy, which you propose?—It is not I that propose it: *Res ipsa dicit*; and if the fatal consequences of this alliance with Turkey, whether they are to take place to-morrow, or whether by an artful profession of a desire of peace the court of Russia can defer them till they are more ripe for their accomplishment; if these consequences, I say, are truly depicted, no thinking man can have avoided entertaining the thought, that they must be counteracted and averted by open force; and this thought being once admitted, the sooner it is resorted to, the better. Many circumstances would recommend it; but the all-important one is, the present union and good understanding which subsists between France and England.

I am far, however, from meaning to insinuate by this opinion, that this good understanding is either necessarily or probably to be of short duration. The last thirty or forty years have given us innumerable occasions of beating each other into a sentiment of esteem, though not much of love, one towards the other; and there is no man of the two countries, who has lived

through the period of the first French revolution till the general peace of 1815, or who has acquainted himself with the miraculous achievements of both through that time, who can now entertain any sentiment like contempt (the most alienating and unforgiving of all feelings) for the individuals or for the mass of the one or the other nation. If each thinks its own people the first in the world (and who stands more in need of forgiveness than Great Britain for that proud thought?) each gives the second rank among nations to the other : and while this peace and harmony exist, a generous rivalry will by degrees spring up (of which we have seen the first example in that unhappy affair of Navarino) and will perhaps ripen into a sincere and lasting friendship.

Be this as it may, the existing good understanding between Great Britain and France presents such a union of two such powers as (it may be said without vanity) no other nation of Europe could oppose with any prospect of success, and as the rest of Europe, if arrayed against them, could not contemplate without great apprehension. But it does much more. It offers a spectacle, which Europe and the world has never yet witnessed—I mean the combination of the two great instruments of modern welfare, the naval and military, with

such an overwhelming preponderance, as to double and to treble its force against any point, to which its united attack may be unexpectedly directed. God forbid! that this combination should ever be found in the hands of a single nation: for the peace and freedom of the world would be at its mercy: and it is, I may say, solely due, under divine Providence, to the circumstance of these two instruments being placed in different hands, and to the circumstance too of the naval preponderating power being essentially confined to one, that Europe has been indebted for its liberty and its equilibrium for the last two hundred years.

It is a singular circumstance, that the two powers of Europe, who mean now or at some future day to array themselves by their exclusive alliance against this union of the greatest military with the greatest maritime power, are precisely the two nations, whose whole experience in naval warfare has been derived from their conflicts with each other.

Through obstinate struggles perpetually renewed, long undecided—through a period of nearly three centuries, with the Spaniards, the Dutch, the French—with the bravest, the most warlike and the most skilful seamen of Europe—have the English fought themselves up to the highest point of naval power and glory; and

they mainly owe this pre-eminence, not less to the valour and skill of their enemies, than to their own. For what permanent reputation could have been founded on the easy defeat of a contemptible foe? But with Russia, her sole experience of naval warfare has been in her battles with the Ottoman. She may boast of Tchisme, of Tenedos, of brilliant victories insured, before they were fought, by the ignorance, the indiscipline, the worse than cowardice of their bigotted opponents. But has she ever witnessed—Has one of her admirals ever been present in his own man-of-war, at the spectacle of a line of battle of a hostile fleet in an open sea? With no wish to disparage the maritime skill of the Russians, which is however almost of as much consequence as bravery in a naval action, it must be said, that we have no knowledge from history of what they are capable, nor have they any experience what it is to fight at sea with a really maritime nation.

The only exception that I am aware of, in which they have had an encounter with a British man-of-war, took place in the Baltic Sea, in the year 1808, almost at the time when the Emperor Alexander was engaged in the famous conference at Erfurt. Two ships of the line, the one commanded by an illustrious admiral (now no more) the other by a gallant captain, who still lives,

had been dispatched to act with the Swedish fleet in the Gulf of Finland. In ignorance of this circumstance, the Russian squadron of **six** or more ships of the line appeared before the harbour in which the former lay at anchor ; **but** on discovering it, they immediately sailed away, and were pursued under a press of sail by the two English ships, slowly and reluctantly followed by the Swedish squadron, which was in truth enfeebled by sickness and disease. One of the two English ships, commanded by the gallant captain, by her superiority of sailing, came up with the sternmost ship of the Russian fleet, brought her to action, made her strike her flag in the sight and almost in the presence of her consorts ; but was unable from that cause to take possession of his prize. The other ships in fact were near enough to shift her wounded people, to renew her crew ; and on the approach of the second English man-of-war, with the admiral on board, left her to make the best of her way to the port, Baltic Port, to which they themselves retired. In this condition the English admiral's ship carried her by boarding, and equally unable to bring her away, set her on fire upon taking out the crew. These strangers, as the same gallant captain* observed on another brilliant

* Captain (now Admiral) Sir Byam Martin, in H. M. ship Implacable.—Sir Samuel Hood was on board H. M. ship Centaur, Captain Webley.

occasion, required some lessons on what they had to expect on coming into conflict with England:—certainly their experience with Turkey had furnished no such examples.

But in order to give lessons of this kind, England requires no external aid ; nor indeed, if we are to judge by the solicitude discovered by Russia to close the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus against foreign ships, would it appear that she meant to furnish many such opportunities to one part at least of her naval force ; nor, in short, would such lessons, twenty times repeated by ships alone, attain the end, the great and sole object which France and England united ought to propose to themselves—that of setting permanent limits to the farther extension of the Russian dominion in Europe, already too vast for the tranquil balance of her separate states.

But has the court of St. Petersburg ever reflected upon what is to be achieved by the combined effect of these two mighty instruments of war, army and navy—to the augmentation of which there is no limit but the financial resources of the two wealthiest nations of Europe—exposed to no danger in their passage to the intended point of attack but that which the elements may present ;—moving towards that point with a secrecy which no foresight can penetrate and no

precaution guard against—and co-operating against it with a unity of design and a combination of powers, which are rarely to be seen, and never to be resisted? Have they considered that the Dardanelles are as assailable as Cronstadt?—that the mouths of the Danube are as approachable as the mouths of the Thames?—and that without violating the neutrality of a single power, or wading on shore through a host of unwilling or hostile nations, in order to reach the one enemy, the contest may be brought to an issue on such points as the assailants shall choose for themselves?—But I stop all these reflections, meaning only to give some faint notion of the vast power of a naval and military combination under such circumstances of union and force:—I waive all consideration of plans of campaign, for which thousands are more competent than myself, to proceed to what ought to be the great and sole object of all warfare not absolutely inhuman—I mean an equitable, safe, and durable tranquillity.

We have seen within these very few last years an idea thrown out in the public negotiations of the great powers of Europe, which if it were seriously and sincerely entertained by them all, and were carried to its accomplishment with their full determination to enforce and maintain it against every violation, might be attended with

the happiest results in the particular instance to which the idea was first proposed to be applied, and might be extended to many other similar situations.—I allude to the plan of interposing between the dominions of a powerful state and its weaker neighbour another state, as in the instance of the newly-formed kingdom of Belgium, to which all the greater powers should furnish, each against the other, a permanent guarantee of perpetual neutrality and peace. Not that I mean to express any approbation or otherwise of the particular instance which gave origin to this plan ; because I am persuaded, that if it had been seriously entertained by France on one side, and not adopted by Great Britain on the other, as a *pis aller*, the best she could imagine when once the Belgian revolution had taken place, it might have been applied to the whole kingdom of the Netherlands without any revolution or separation at all, with much happier effect and greater security to the Dutch as well as the Belgians. Both of them must have rejoiced to be placed in such a state of peace and security. This however by-the-by.

But if this Turkish-Russian question must be decided by arms, what ought to hinder two such powers as Great Britain and France from proposing to themselves, as the ultimate object of all their efforts, the establishment of independent

kingdoms about the present dominions of Russia, to serve, by their peaceful neutrality stipulated and guaranteed by all the powers, as a permanent barrier against the farther enlargement of that power, as well on the side of Turkey as of the north-western frontier of the Russian dominions?—The provinces of Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, with the course of the Danube from its mouth until it strikes the Austrian dominions in Hungary, formed into one kingdom on the conditions above mentioned, would establish this barrier to the south. The revival of the kingdom of Poland, with the same territorial limits as it formerly possessed, or with only such modifications of them as would leave the great object secure, would make it, as it had formerly been, an effectual barrier on the north-west.

The three provinces above named have been for years past of no use and benefit to Russia and Turkey, except as the theatres of war between the two countries, in which all the prosperity and resources of the provinces have been sacrificed, and as stepping-stones to the progress of Russian ambition: and their erection into an independent, neutral and pacific kingdom under the government of an European prince, would open to these unhappy countries a prospect of future tranquillity, of which they have been deprived for ages.

If I were called upon to cite an instance of the short-sighted policy of unprincipled ambition, and of the sure, however slow, steps, by which crime makes its own act the instrument* of its own punishment, a more pregnant example could scarcely be adduced than that of the partition of Poland, as it affects the three powers combined in that work of iniquity. The punishment of the great offender is yet to come, though it cannot be denied, that its acquisitions have cost its people more blood and more misery than any single external war in which it has ever been engaged. But in the conspiracy of the other two powers, Austria and Prussia, to annihilate a kingdom which for ages had barricaded Russia out of Europe on the one hand, and had saved on the other Germany, and perhaps eventually Europe, from the ravages of the victorious Ottoman—what was this but to bring them into immediate contact with a gigantic power, towards whom they must be from that moment in a state of forced friendship or dangerous enmity; who had already appropriated to itself the lion's share of the prey they had run down together, and who could not extend its dominions towards the west (the only possible direction except that of Turkey) but by an invasion of the shares of

* *Raro antecedentem scelestum,
Deseruit pede Pœna claudo.* HOR.

its two confederates. We have seen in effect at the peace of Tilsit in 1807, and that of Schoenbrunn in the year 1809, this overgrown empire enlarging itself, though with small and base additions, at the expense of its two friends, Prussia and Austria; and the vast acquisition made by Russia at the congress of Vienna, though taken nominally from the King of Saxony as Duke of Warsaw, was for the most part the plunder torn from Prussia at the peace of Tilsit, and ought, according to all common principles of friendship and alliance, to have been restored to her at the general peace.

Under such circumstances of contiguity, and at the same time of comparative inferiority, can any reflecting statesman conscientiously maintain that Prussia is to be henceforward regarded as an independent power? Mortifying as the confession may be to the pride of the House of Austria, can even this more powerful state feel itself so much at its ease on the side of its Russian frontier, as not to prefer a forced alliance and a reluctant friendship to the danger of a rupture with so dangerous and overpowering a neighbour? His Majesty the King of Prussia may disguise his real situation, even to himself, under the names of friendship, of gratitude, of the dearest ties of affinity and relationship; but these very ties themselves, do not they bind him

more and more closely to the car of Russian ambition? The House of Austria may lay the same flattering unction to the soul, that the union of the three partitioning powers is necessary to the security of their ill-gotten plunder, which in reality is constantly endangered by their contiguity.—But I would appeal to the heart of the King of Prussia (virtuous and benevolent sovereign as he is) whether all those endearing ties would not be a thousand times more endeared by the reflection, that between him and his imperial son-in-law there existed a mighty barrier in the shape of a kingdom, of which the independence, the perpetual peace, and the neutrality, were guaranteed by himself, by the House of Austria, by Great Britain and France, and even by Russia herself:—aye, you will say, Sir—there's the rub:—who will bell the cat?—You have the answer in the foregoing reasoning. I have pointed out the two nations capable of it.—I have indicated the means.—The *quomodo*? with those means, I must leave to more able and more experienced heads to show.

But now comes the last and perhaps the hardest question to answer—a question which you, Sir, are too high-minded to make, if you feel yourself at all satisfied with the view which I have taken of this subject; but which a thousand

other persons will put again and again, who think that a satisfactory answer to it is to stand in the place of honour, of national security, of national independence—What are we to *gain* by this fine plan? And this detested word of *gain*, which is perpetually thrown out against us, though most unjustly, on the continent, is to be weighed against all the dearest interests of ourselves and our posterity for generations to come.

I would rather, in answer to this question, use the language of an illustrious statesman, now no more, and tell what we shall *not* gain by it.—We shall *not* gain, then, a Greco-Russian empire, extending from the White to the Red Sea, and from the Gulf of Persia to that of Venice.—We shall *not* gain the Euxine, the Mediterranean, and the Baltic, to be *Maria clausa*—to be shut or opened at the sole pleasure of a northern autocrator. For will any one say to me, that the Russian Emperor, whose influence extends over the southern, and, I doubt too, over the northern (Swedish) shore of the Baltic, will scruple to demand from Denmark the keys of the Sound, as he has demanded and got those of the Dardanelles?

As for positive gain to Great Britain, in the direct base sense of acquisition to pay her expenses, if I were to survey the Russian empire

from Archangel to Astrachan, from Kamschatka to Warsaw, I would exclaim with Molière's* *femme de chambre*—*Ma foi, Monsieur ! Toute votre peau ne me tenteroit pas !* And as for Turkey, though many beautiful little kingdoms might be carved out of that delightful empire, yet I must say, in the language of the incomparable Sancho, that for a British king, if it were to rain crowns, I do not think that one would be found to fit his head.

But I am afraid, Sir, that I have heartily fatigued you with this long discussion ; and I own to you, that somewhat from the same feeling I suppress many and many reflections to which this fruitful subject would lead me. There remains only a single consideration farther to submit to you.

Many seriously disposed and pious persons may think they see, in the recent events between Russia and Turkey, the first steps towards the destruction of Mahometanism, and would think they were opposing the designs of Providence, if they took any measures to stop the course or avert the consequences of these events. I know that many entertained the same opinion in relation to Napoleon and the western Antichrist. He is gone, however, and England opposed suc-

* In the *Tartuffe*.

cessfully and defeated all his plans. Yet who can say, that the designs of Providence were not carried forward towards their accomplishment by his instrumentality, defeated as he was? The Almighty makes crimes, no less than virtues, work to the completion of His own views: but man must not say that the All-good therefore favours crime. He makes it subservient to its own punishment, while it is the instrument of His providence: but man must not reason or act by the view which *he* takes of His ways. He must not neglect to oppose himself to the march of an unprincipled ambition, because he may *think* that it is promoting the views of the Almighty. The duty imposed on man is to resist crime, wherever and whenever he sees it in action, singly and collectively, nationally and individually. And he may rest assured, that whatever may appear to his short sight to be the success or the failure of his efforts in the line of his duty, he is equally and surely advancing the intentions of Providence, and that in a manner the most pleasing and most acceptable to the Divine Nature.

In the preceding pages I have endeavoured, Sir, to prove,—

First, that the conduct of England and France

(if indeed they acted on this occasion in concert) in refusing the aid of a squadron of ships to the Grand Seignior, was injudicious, impolitic, and unkind ; because the influence of their united name, and the knowledge of what they were able to do against the very heart of the Egyptian vice-royalty (which by-the-by the Russians,* with all their power, could not do except by a long and tedious land campaign) would have produced an immediate effect on the determination of Mehemet Ali and his son, and much more

* I cannot refrain from adding an observation here, which ought to have had its place in an antecedent part of this letter, in relation to the very embarrassing dilemma into which the Russians and Turks would have brought themselves, had Ibrahim refused all terms of accommodation, and, keeping himself on the defensive in Cilicia within the passes of Mount Taurus, have bid defiance to the land forces of Russia, the only part of their auxiliary force which could have been brought into action ; for neither on this, nor indeed on any future occasion, could the Russian fleet show itself out of the Dardanelles without the consent of France and England. In this state of things, the only mode for Turkey to receive effectual assistance must have been then, and must be hereafter, that most dangerous and equivocal one of admitting a Russian army, to an unlimited amount, to take possession of all its provinces, as well European as Asiatic, where the danger may appear to require it ; and then the question will be—What power will force them to retire ?

I leave this hint for the future consideration of the Turkish statesmen, should another occasion arise of calling for the armed intervention of Russia.

favourable terms for the Grand Seignior, if that were an object worthy of consideration; and it would have been so, if such an act of friendship had united more closely the interests of the **Porte** with those of France and England:—because it was impossible not to foresee, that, driven to the last extremity, the Grand Seignior must of necessity have recourse to the only remaining power that had the means of giving him aid, and whose influence at the Porte, whether hostile or friendly, it had been hitherto the constant policy of both powers to keep within reasonable bounds.

Secondly, That as it was perfectly natural for the Emperor Nicholas to seize with avidity the occasion offered to him of converting the Ottoman government (or at any rate the Grand Seignior) from a state of enmity and hatred to one of friendship and good-will, even without the prospect of other immediate advantage, so the two governments of France and England, who had furnished this occasion by their own refusal, had no right to complain, nor could put forward justly any pretension, that this aid should be refused or withdrawn.

Thirdly, That if circumstances had remained between Russia and Turkey, as before, after the object of the Russian intervention had been attained; and if the auxiliary forces had been withdrawn (as indeed they were promptly, and

the court of St. Petersburg assumes great merit from this moderation) without any attempt to draw the Porte into closer or more intimate engagements, the two courts of Paris and of London must have acquiesced of necessity in the loss of influence incurred by their own act, and however mortifying it were to confess themselves *out-policied*, they could have no other ground of resentment against the Emperor than what arises from the sentiment of having over-reached themselves.

Fourthly, That however, the defensive alliance offered by the court of St. Petersburg to the Porte (for it is ridiculous to give it the name of a *mutual* defensive treaty) which gives to the former the privilege of an armed intervention, or more properly a protectorate against any internal or external enemy of Turkey—in itself exclusive enough, and rendered still more exclusive and even hostile by the separate stipulation in relation to the Dardanelles—changes the whole character of the previous transactions, gives to France and England the right, and imposes upon them the duty, of demanding the revocation of this treaty, or their admission into it, as contracting parties—the only mode by which this instrument can be stripped of its hostile and suspicious character.

Fifthly, That the preservation of the general

peace in Europe is of so much importance to every civilized nation, that if the revocation of the treaty, or the admission of other powers into it, can be obtained without a recourse to measures of hostility, the demands of Great Britain and France ought to be limited to this point, however it may be subject, like all other merely diplomatic arrangements, to changes or infractions from change of circumstances among the powers. But that—

Sixthly, If all the means of negotiation should be tried ineffectually, and those of arms be unavoidably resorted to (which must of necessity be the case at an early or more distant, probably a less favourable, season) the efforts of the two combined powers ought to be directed to the attainment, if possible, of a still greater and more efficient measure : viz. an absolute territorial guarantee against the future encroachments of Russia, by the erection around her of independent kingdoms, whose state of neutrality and perpetual peace should be guaranteed by the other powers of Europe immediately interested in it, as well as by Russia herself: the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, the ancient kingdom of Poland, and (if necessary) the Grand Duchy of Swedish Finland, furnishing the necessary materials for this erection—nations, never forming a part of Russia properly so called, in-

corporated with her by no right but that of conquest or spoliation, and which for the most part have borne for ages, and still bear, a most deadly hatred to the Russian name and dominion.

These are gigantic ideas, you will say, Sir ; and it must be confessed, that they are so. Yet Europe, or rather the two powers of Great Britain and France, possess gigantic means of realizing them : and I will go so far as to say, that the federal equilibrium of Europe, which has now subsisted for nearly two centuries, and which, after all the storms and revolutions and changes disturbing it for a time, has still subsided again into its balanced position, will never hereafter be able to exert the same conservative and renovating principle, unless some such limit as I have above indicated can be put to the advances of this Slavonic power, a power essentially military and despotic, and professing no principle of government or conduct, as indeed they themselves boast, in common with the other nations of civilized Europe.

I am, &c.

LONDON :

IBOTSON AND PALMER, PRINTERS, SAVOY STREET, STRAND.



